In macro-historical terms, we are just a century after the major upheavals in North Africa and the Greater Middle East, which marked the final phase of the definitive collapse of the Ottoman Empire. However, the stakes remain the same; the importance of this geographical zone has become even greater, and Turkey has incorporated the neo-Ottoman imperative of acquiring a hegemonic position over this geographical complex into its decision-making system.
Consequently, the neo-Ottoman direction of Turkish geostrategy has become indissociable from the Libyan crisis, while the very distribution of power within the complex has contributed to the redefinition of Turkish geostrategic assessments and their corresponding objectives. This neo-Ottoman direction has been established through a long process of ferment at the level of cultural and social formations within Turkey, which support, give meaning to, and legitimize geostrategic decisions at the international level.
In a similar vein, neo-Ottoman postulates are being transformed from rhetorical and ideological narratives into feasible geostrategy regarding strategically eradicated Syria, strategically weakened Iraq, ideologically drained Albania and Bosnia, bureaucratically externally dependent Bulgaria, Tunisia—which is under the firm presence of the Muslim Brotherhood—objectively powerless Cyprus, and economically weakened Greece.
The same was attempted in the case of Egypt under Mohamed Morsi until the turn of events in 2013. Obviously, the aforementioned represent the products of Turkish assessments, which touch the limits of wishful thinking precisely because of the neo-Ottoman background of thought and priorities. Undoubtedly, the internal fragmentation of Libya constitutes yet another historical episode of the practical application of neo-Ottoman aims under the specter of an established inter-systemic redistribution of power perceived as a "window of opportunity" by Turkey.
